Winning, in politics and war, isn’t always about which side has the most money or the best equipment. Sometimes it comes down to who fights more astutely with the limited resources at their disposal.
That’s certainly one of the lessons to be learned from America’s modern military incursions, particularly the botched occupation of Afghanistan. And it’s a principle to be found in the landmark book Unrestricted Warfare by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui.
Published in 1999, the book is a treatise on military strategy. The authors are two colonels in the People’s Liberation Army. Although the book has been marketed as China’s “master plan” for destroying America, its tone is, in fact, not so slanted and the principles it expounds can be applied by any actor (including by the U.S. against China, if it chose to).
The book is so titled because it advances the concept of unrestricted warfare — a kind of warfare that is not limited to traditional military action, but that can encompass any kind of action by governments or private individuals, such as economic and other private-sector activity. Hence the name — unrestricted warfare — for it is war that is not restricted to the typical field of combat.
Of course, the Chinese Communist Party has followed this philosophy to a T, as we can see in the way China has done everything from purchasing tracts of land and agriculture in mainland America to creating Confucius Institutes for the purpose of indoctrinating the nation’s students in pro-China propaganda.
By implementing unrestricted warfare, China is getting ever-closer to bringing down U.S. hegemony and establishing itself as the supreme world power without the need for a single shot to be fired.
It would be foolish for anyone involved in war, statecraft, and politics not to use these same principles. That includes those involved in activism on the American Right who want to bring down the Marxist-globalist establishment.
Accordingly, there is one very useful pearl of wisdom found in Unrestricted Warfare that is highly applicable to the realm of American politics.
In the first chapter, Qiao and Wang write that high-tech actors are often at a loss when it comes to dealing with forces using “outdated” and unconventional technologies and tactics. In such situations, the technological superiority of that side becomes a liability, because it no longer knows how to fight in the old ways.
As the authors write:
Viewed from the performance of the U.S. military in Somalia, where they were at a loss when they encountered Aidid’s forces, the most modern military force does not have the ability to control public clamor, and cannot deal with an opponent who does things in an unconventional manner. On the battlefields of the future, the digitized forces may very possibly be like a great cook who is good at cooking lobsters sprinkled with butter: when faced with guerillas who resolutely gnaw corncobs, they can only sigh in despair. The “generation gap” in weapons and military forces is perhaps an issue that requires exceptional attention. The closer the generation gap is, the more pronounced are the battle successes of the more senior generation, while the more the gap opens, the less each party is capable of dealing with the other, and it may reach the point where no one can wipe out the other. Looking at the specific examples of battles that we have, it is difficult for high-tech troops to deal with unconventional warfare and low-tech warfare, and perhaps there is a rule here, or at least it is an interesting phenomenon which is worth studying.
Let’s apply this to the world of American politics. In this case, the more “senior” generation is the establishment, as they have a bigger war chest, namely money and the political assets that money can buy — lobbyists; political-opposition research; journalists-for-hire; favorable entertainment and celebrities; advertising on television, radio, and social media.
Most of the tools the establishment is able to acquire with its money are ones that have been created within the last century, more or less.
It would be wise, then, for right-wing activists to apply the principles of Unrestricted Warfare, as described above, by using techniques of mass persuasion that were used successfully prior to the advent of modern technologies. That can include learning how to organize people in-person, applying the old door-to-door to circumvent the establishment’s access to mass-media advertising and direct mail.
Print publications are also an effective way to get around social-media censorship. Local activists should consider creating their own regular print newsletters, magazines, or newspapers (depending on what kind of budget they’re working with), which they can deliver door-to-door or via mail, or make available at highly frequented public locations such as libraries and stores.
Finally, right-wing activists should diligently learn the arts of personal magnetism and public speaking. This is something that has been highly lost today; most politicians get elected thanks to all the advertising dollars spent on their behalf; none can hold a candle to the oratorical abilities of public speakers of the past.
Think of it as guerrilla political warfare. In the face of the establishment’s enormous resources, we must play smart if we want to win.
